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International police cooperation depends on reliable information, individualised evidence and effective safeguards against politically motivated requests. When those safeguards fail, international alerts and extradition requests can expose individuals to detention, restrictions on movement and the risk of return to persecution. Protection may also become ineffective when a request rejected within one system reappears through another channel.

This SRL Swiss report examines the scrutiny of Türkiye-origin requests within INTERPOL and other international police cooperation mechanisms, focusing predominantly on people associated with the Hizmet/Gülen movement. Its central concern is the continuity of protection: a finding that a request raises human-rights or political-character concerns should remain visible when the same person or underlying file is considered by another authority.

Individual responsibility and the underlying allegations

The report examines the European Court of Human Rights judgments in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v Türkiye, Demirhan and Others v Türkiye and Yasak v Türkiye. It considers their implications for assessing requests that rely on general indicators of association rather than clearly identified individual criminal conduct.

Messaging applications, banking transactions, educational employment, association membership and other social or professional activities require examination in their specific context. The report argues that listing such indicators does not replace an explanation of the conduct attributed to the individual, the relevant period, the alleged organisational role and the required criminal intent. International scrutiny must therefore examine the substance of the originating file, rather than relying solely on its classification as a terrorism case.

INTERPOL safeguards and gaps between cooperation channels

Article 2 of INTERPOL’s Constitution places its activities within a human-rights framework, while Article 3 prohibits activities of a political, military, religious or racial character. The report examines the review of Notices and Diffusions under these provisions and the role of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files.

A central finding concerns what happens after a request is rejected or a record is deleted. Removal from INTERPOL’s systems does not necessarily remove a person from a domestic wanted list or prevent authorities from pursuing bilateral or regional cooperation. A protective assessment inside INTERPOL can therefore coexist with continuing exposure to action based on the same underlying allegations elsewhere.

The report also distinguishes receipt of a communication from approval of its contents. Wanted Persons Diffusions may reach recipient National Central Bureaus while INTERPOL’s review remains pending, although they are not searchable in its databases before review and authorisation. Receipt alone does not establish compliance or justify detention, transfer or interference with migration status.

Resubmissions under different offence labels

The report examines a publicly disclosed copy of a letter attributed to the Turkish General Directorate of Security, dated 18 June 2025, concerning journalist Levent Kenez. The document discusses pursuing international action under an allegation relating to personal data after identifying obstacles to Red Notice action concerning alleged affiliation with the Gülen movement.

The analysis expressly distinguishes the published copy from an independently authenticated official document. Its significance lies in the scrutiny required when a request reappears under a different offence heading. Authorities should examine the underlying events, links with earlier proceedings, possible connections to journalistic activity and the independent evidential basis of the new allegation.

SRL Swiss’s notifications to the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration and the INTERPOL General Secretariat are also documented. These establish that the Association raised its concerns; they do not establish authentication or endorsement by the recipients.

Recommendations for effective protection

SRL Swiss calls for human-rights-based deletion and cancellation decisions to be promptly reflected in national databases and operational systems. Later requests should be matched with earlier files so that a change of offence label or cooperation channel does not obscure previous findings.

The report proposes a dedicated review sub-unit within INTERPOL’s General Secretariat, linked to the existing Notices and Diffusions Task Force, to strengthen scrutiny of the requests examined. It recommends reasoned rejection of non-compliant requests, removal of incompatible records, notification of recipient countries and enhanced review where repeated misuse is established. Existing corrective measures, including restrictions on data-processing rights where warranted, should be applied effectively.

Continuity of protection does not mean that one State’s decision automatically binds every other authority. It requires subsequent decision-makers to address previously identified risks and explain any different conclusion. Information sharing should remain secure and limited to what is necessary for that protective assessment.

Submitted to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, the report seeks stronger institutional scrutiny and explanations concerning resubmissions under different offence labels. It distinguishes judicial findings, official materials and reported allegations, and records Türkiye’s position that its measures are lawful.

For the complete legal analysis, examination of documented requests, institutional recommendations and source references, read the full SRL Swiss report below.

Read the Full Report (PDF)